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  Abstract: The objective of this paper is to present a set of working rules 
which will lead to more consistency and rigor in future cost – benefit 
analyses (CBA) and hence to better informed decision making. In order to 
ensure consistency within a Member State, it is proposed that Member 
States develop their own guidance frameworks taking account of specific 
institutional settings, particularly for transport and environment sectors. 
The paper provides guidance on determining the basis on which the EU 
grant will be established and the particular issues relating to the 
profitability that would normally be expected, the polluter pays principle, 
affordability and public private partnerships. 
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 Determination of the EU grant 
Article 55(2)of the European Commission Guide to cost – benefit analysis of 
investment projects, 2002, maintains the funding-gap method as the basis for the 
calculation of EU grant in revenue-generating projects, stipulating that the eligible 
expenditure cannot exceed the current value of the investment cost less the current 
value of the net revenue from the investment over a specific reference period 
appropriate to the category of investment concerned. 
However, in contrast to the 2000-2006 period, the eligible expenditure and not 
the cofinancing rate is modulated in order to relate the contribution from the Funds to 
the revenues generated by the project. 
It should be noted that Article 55 applies to all projects and not just to major 
projects. However, “Member States may adopt procedures proportionate to the amounts 
concerned for monitoring revenues generated by operations whose total cost is below € 
200.000” – Art. 55(5). 
Scope 
Art. 55 applies to investment operations which generate net revenues through 
charges borne directly by users. It does not apply to the following cases: 
Projects that do not generate revenues (e.g., roads without tolls) 
Projects whose revenues do not fully cover the operating costs (e.g., some 
railways) 
Projects subject to state-aid rules – Art. 55(6). 
As a general rule, for all projects that can be subject to COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS (CBA) it should be possible to estimate the expected revenues, if any,  
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according to Article 55(2). When the estimation of future revenues proves to be 
difficult, particular attention should be paid to the sensitivity and risk analysis. 
The determination of the level of Community assistance is based on the 
“funding gap” rate of the project, i.e. the share of the discounted cost of the initial 
investment not covered by the discounted net revenue of the project. 
The identification of the eligible expenditure according to Art. 55(2) ensures 
that the project has enough financial resources to be implemented and avoids the 
granting of an undue advantage to the recipient of the aid, i.e. over-financing of the 
project.  
There are presented the steps to be followed to determine the EU grant in 
accordance with Art. 55. 
Steps to determining the EU grant 2007-2013 programming period 
Step 1. Find the funding-gap rate (R): 
R = Max EE/DIC 
where 
Max EE is the maximum eligible expenditure = DIC-DNR (Art. 55.2) 
DIC is the discounted investment cost 
DNR is the discounted net revenue = discounted revenues – discounted operating costs 
+ discounted residual value 
Step 2. Find the “decision amount” (DA), i.e. “the amount to which the co-
financing rate for the priority axis applies” (Art. 41.2): 
DA = EC*R 
where 
EC is the eligible cost. 
Step 3. Find the (maximum) EU grant: 
EU grant = DA*Max CRpa 
where 
Max CRpa is the maximum co-funding rate fixed for the priority axis in the   
Commission’s decision adopting the operational programme (Art. 53.6). 
Specific issues 
Normally expected profitability 
Profitability refers to the amount of profit received relative to the amount 
invested. The simplest way to assess profitability is to measure the internal rate of 
return of the investment, that is the discount rate that makes the discounted flow of the 
project’s costs and revenues add up to zero. In other words, the internal rate of return is 
the discount rate at which a stream of costs and revenues has a net present value (NPV) 
of zero. 
The profitability of an investment normally expected is that which provides 
enough income to exactly cover the inputs’ opportunity cost (the best alternative return 
that could be earned by the investor’s labour, management and equity capital). 
The expected profitability may be strictly dependent on the project’s risks. Risk 
in turn depends on numerous factors such as: the socio-economic context of the 
country/region in which the project is implemented, the difficulties of implementation 
of the project, its economic lifetime, the currency exchange risk and, above all, the risk 
related to the projected revenues. These should be appropriately dealt with in the 
sensitivity and risk analysis. Art. 55 allows designing the Funds’ interventions in such a  
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way that normal expected profitability is duly taken into account and no over-financing 
occurs. This aspect is particularly relevant when a private partner is involved in the 
project. In this case, the contribution from the Funds should be determined prudently so 
that no undue profit is reaped by the private investor. 
Table 1 
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It should be noted that the table is based on the financial rate of return of the investment 
(FRR/C) which may considerably vary across country and does not necessarily reflect 
the profitability expected by the investor(s). This should be checked on a case-by-case 
basis by the project promoter, particularly when a private investor is involved, by 
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Polluter Pays Principle 
The Polluter Pays Principle is one of the principles of Community environmental policy 
(Art. 174 EC Treaty) and applies throughout the European territory. Specific 
Community legislative provisions exist for waste. Under Directive 2006/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on waste, in accordance with the polluter pays 
principle, the cost of disposing of waste must be borne by the holder who has waste 
handled by a waste collector or by an undertaking and/or by the previous holders or the 
producer from which the waste came (Art. 15). 
According to the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, “Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of 
the costs of water services, including environmental and resource costs, in accordance 
in particular with the polluter pays principle” (Art. 9). 
The Commission aims to encourage charging systems where the 
environmental costs of pollution and preventive measures are borne by those who 
cause pollution. 
These charging systems should be proportional to the social marginal 
production costs, including costs for the environment and those linked to the scarcity of 
the resources in the case of water, or calculated in such a way as to influence the choice 
of use of the different modes of operation. So for instance, for transport infrastructure, 
the charge should cover not only infrastructure costs, but also external costs, i.e. costs 
connected with accidents, air pollution, noise and congestion. 
It should be noted that the funding-gap method has disincentive effects for the 
application of the polluter pays principle as higher tariffs result in a lower contribution 
from the Funds, all else equal. However, managing authorities should bear in mind that 
an appropriate charging system is not only valuable from an economic point of view but 
is also desirable for the financial sustainability of operations in the long run. 
Equity (affordability) 
In the context of Art. 55, “considerations of equity linked to the relative 
prosperity of the Member State” are to be taken as referring to the affordability of 
tariffs. Art. 55 implicitly refers to possible variations of the Community assistance 
(through the determination of eligible expenditure), according to the relative wealth of 
the country or region concerned, that is to say the capacity of the users to pay. For a 
given project, the lower the tariffs the higher the EU grant, ceteris paribus. So, 
assuming that the tariffs are set to take regional (national) income levels into account, 
the lower the regional (national) income the higher the funds’ contribution. In order to 
enhance allocative efficiency, the Commission wishes to encourage the development of 
charging systems which reflect the social marginal production cost. However, when the 
affordability of tariffs is considered, Member States may wish to artificially cap the 
level of charges with a view to avoiding a disproportionate financing burden for the 
users, thereby ensuring that the service or good is affordable also for the most 
disadvantaged groups. 
Ideally, the charging system should be based on the real consumption of 
resources, and tariffs should at least cover operating and maintenance costs as well as a 
significant part of the assets’ depreciation. An adequate tariff structure should be 
envisaged attempting to maximize the project’s revenues before public subsidies, while 
taking affordability into account. For instance, a commonly accepted affordability ratio 
for water supply and sanitation is 4%.  
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The Commission encourages the Member States to provide information in their 
guidance documents about the affordability ratios (for average and/or low-income 
groups) which may be taken as a benchmark for the projects that will be submitted for 
co-financing. 
Managing authorities should be aware of the possible trade-off between the 
long-term financial sustainability of the operations and the level of tariff at which users 
will be charged for a good or service taking into account affordability criteria. 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
Public private partnership (PPP) arrangements come in many forms and are still 
an evolving concept which must be adapted to the individual needs and characteristics 
of each project and the project partners. PPP may be an appropriate method of financing 
investment where there is significant scope for involving the private sector, so as to 
provide additional capital and a more efficient service. Particular attention should then 
be paid to the legal structure of the PPP, as this may affect to some extent the eligibility 
of expenditure that can be co-financed. PPP arrangements appear particularly attractive 
for the new Member States given the enormous financing requirements, the large 
funding shortfall, the need for efficient public services, growing market stability, and 
trends creating a favorable environment for private investment. 
In the context of CBA, the following aspects need to be borne in mind when the 
financial analysis is carried out: 
The  financial discount rate may be increased to reflect a higher 
opportunity cost of capital to the private investor. This should be justified by the project 
promoter on a case-by-case basis, providing evidence, where available, of the private 
investor’s past returns on similar projects. 
Under several types of PPP schemes (e.g., BOT, DBFO) the owner of the 
infrastructure (typically the public partner) is different from the operator (the private 
partner). The financial analysis is usually carried out from the point of view of the 
owner of the infrastructure. However, in such cases, a consolidated analysis (owner 
and operator) should be used for the determination of the funding gap. 
 Under Article 55(1), the revenue that needs to be considered for the calculation of the 
eligible expenditure and subsequently of the project’s funding gap is that directly paid 
by the users through charges. 
For instance, under a “shadow tolling” model, users pay no fees. Instead, the public 
body (owner) pays “tolls” to the private partner (operator) for a given concession 
period. Using a consolidated financial analysis for the determination of the funding gap 
ensures that the “tolls” are not considered in this case, consistent with the provisions of 
Article 55(1). Indeed, the revenue for the operator corresponds to the cost borne by the 
owner, so that in the consolidated analysis the two cancel each other out and do not 
affect the project’s net cash flows. 
Concluding remarks 
Member States are responsible for applying the provisions laid down in the 
regulations with regard to cost-benefit analysis and revenue generating projects. For 
ERDF and Cohesion Fund major projects, the Commission takes the decision and in it 
sets the contribution from the funds in the light of the information contained in the 
application and further appraisals if necessary.  
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In order to ensure consistency within a Member State, it is proposed that 
Member States develop their own guidance frameworks taking account of specific 
institutional settings, particularly for the transport and environment sectors. The 
Commission will continue to assist Member States in their task, with the aid of 
JASPERS, in order to ensure proper application of EU guidance to national contexts. 
This approach will bring substantial benefits in terms of simplification both for 
the Commission and the Member States, and thereby contribute to speeding up decision 
procedures for large projects. It will also have an important capacity building effect 
with a view to the programming period 2007-13. 
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